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Sudden Illness as a Defense in Auto Accidents
Annmarie R. Kirchner*
T ODAY, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS constitute a major source of actions
at law for negligence. Some of these mishaps may have sudden
illness of the motor vehicle operator as the primary or contributing
cause. The purpose of this note is to examine the question of sudden ill-
ness and its possible value as a defense when negligence is charged
against an automobile driver.
One may escape liability under the law by pleading and proving
an affirmative defense.' One defense open to the defendant is that the
accident was unavoidable or was an act of God.2 An unavoidable acci-
dent has been defined as an inevitable accident,3 an event or an oc-
currence which could not have been prevented by any human fore-
sight or ordinary prudence, the result occurring without fault.4 An
act of God is a term defined as an accident or an occasion lacking a
human agent,, such as windstorms, rainstorms,7 floods,s ice and sleet,9
lightning,' 0 landslides," natural leakage of oil and gas,' 2 unexplained
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1 Prosser, Torts, 426-470 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 320; Howie III, Act of God, A Reconsideration, 18
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 336 (1961); Findlay, Torts-Negligence-Act of God, Pa. Scorns
"Irreverent" Usage, Displays Preference of "Vis Major," 37 Notre Dame Law. 734
(1962). For examples of pleading of "Act of God" as a defense, see, Oleck, Negli-
gence Forms of Pleading, 436-7, 789, 1047 (1957 rev. ed.) (It need not be specially
pleaded).
3 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 142.
4 38 Am. Jur., Negligence § 65 (1941); Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 143-46.
5 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 426-470; Howie III, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 336; Findlay,
op. cit. supra n. 2 at 734.
6 Feeney v. New York Waist House, 105 Conn. Rep. 647, 136 A. 554 (1927); Lee v.
Crittenden County, 216 Ark. 480, 226 S.W.2d 79 (1950); Brewer v. United States, 108
F.Supp. 889 (D.C. Ga. 1952); Young v. Marlas, 243 Iowa 367, 51 N.W.2d 443 (1952);
Swanson v. LaFontaine, 238 Minn. 460, 57 N.W.2d 262 (1953).
7 Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 231 P.2d 921 (1951); Western & Atlantic R.R.
v. Hassler, 92 Ga. App. 278, 88 S.E.2d 559 (1955).
8 Standard Brands v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 42 F.Supp. 43 (D.C. Mass. 1941);
Krichau v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 150 Neb. 498, 34 N.W.2d 899 (1948); City of Ports-
mouth v. Culpepper, 192 Va. 362, 64 S.E.2d 799 (1951); Hilzer v. Farmers Irr. Dist.,
156 Neb. 398, 56 N.W.2d 457 (1953); Snyder v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 157 Neb. 771, 61
N.W.2d 557 (1953); Thrasher v. Amere Gas Utilities Co., 138 W.Va. 166, 75 S.E.2d
376 (1953); Cover v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d
661 (1956).
9 Public Service Co. v. Sonagerra, 208 Okl. 95, 253 P.2d 169 (1953).
10 Sauer v. Rural Co-Op Power Ass'n of Maple Lake, 225 Minn. 356, 31 N.W.2d 15
(1948).
11 Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R'd Co., 140 U.S. 435, 11 S.Ct. 859, 35 L. ed. 458 (1891).
12 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lemmons, 198 Okl. 596, 181 P.2d 568 (1947); Renegar v. Bogie,
199 Okl. 427, 186 P.2d 820 (1947); Thrasher v. Amere Gas Util. Co., supra n. 8.
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aircrashes, l5 and unexpected illnesses. 14 It should be noted that con-
fusion can arise between the legal and non-legal definitions of an act
of God. In general the non-legal definition of an act of God is any
"natural" occurrence which takes place on earth. But for legal pur-
poses this must be considerably more restricted. In the legal definition
it would be necessary to show that the event is unforeseeable by use
of reasonable human intelligence and that there is a lack of human
agency as the prime cause of the damage. 15 The occurrence must be
unusual for the time and locale for such recognition. Therefore, not all
unavoidable events are considered by the laws as acts of God.
In order to examine the possible value of illness as a defense it is
necessary to define briefly the general states of human health. Health
is a condition of mind or body in which the physiological processes func-
tion at normal efficiency. 16 Any departure from this norm which re-
sults in an alteration of these processes is considered illness. Since the
turn of the century the mortality rate for various illnesses has been
altered, and the life span of mankind has increased. This is largely due
to the fact that man has been successful in improving his environment,
his nutrition, and his control of some diseases.'7 However, new prob-
lems are arising. As the average life span has increased, there has been
a corresponding increase in the prevalence of illnesses that are con-
sidered degenerative in character. These are associated with the natural
wear of anatomical parts which ultimately alters physiological processes
and are frequently associated with advancing age. These illnesses, or
alterations of physiological functions, may appear without previous
knowledge or warning.
Illnesses are generally categorized as acute or chronic.1s This
classification is frequently misunderstood. The terms do not refer to
the severity of the disease but rather to the suddenness of its onset. The
acute illness has a rapid onset, which produces signs and symptoms
within a short per d of time. It generally runs a brief course, from
which there is usi ally a full recovery, or an abrupt termination in
death. Occasionall: the acute illness may be prolonged and revert to
chronicity. A chronic illness is a lengthy, persistent body condition. Its
13 Lopez v. Resort Airlines, 18 F.R.D. 37 (D.C. N.Y. 1955); Southern Air Transport
v. Gulf Airways, 215 La. 366, 40 So.2d 787 (1949). But this is a question, under some
views.
14 Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. Rep. 690, 34 S.E. 621 (1899); Ringeman v. State, 136
Ala. Rep. 131, 34 So. 351 (1903); Eleason v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 254 Wis.
134, 35 N.W.2d 301 (1948); McClean v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 3 Ill.App.2d
235, 121 N.E.2d 337 (1954), Freifield v. Hennessy, 353 F.2d 97 (3rd Cir. 1965).
15 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 426-470. Howie IU, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 336. Findlay,
op. cit. supra n. 2 at 734.
16 See, generally, Williamson, Biologists in Search of Material (2d ed. 1947).
17 See, generally, Turner, Personal and Community Health (2d ed. 1959).
18 See, generally, Shafer, Sawyer, McCluskey, Bech, Medical-Surgical Nursing 26-35
(1964).
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SUDDEN ILLNESS AS DEFENSE
signs and symptoms may be intermittent, and may be present in an acute
manner. The chronic illness generally runs a long course from which
there may be only partial recovery, or eventual death. 19
In our consideration of the question of liability of the operator of a
motor vehicle, we are of course most concerned with those illnesses as-
sociated with acute symptomatology. The concern from a legal stand-
point revolves mainly around the suddenness of the incapacity which
resulted in the question of a negligent act, and whether this act consti-
tutes actionable negligence, or is an unavoidable occurrence without
fault. A key factor is the state of previous knowledge of his health on
the part of the auto operator. The possibility of his having prior knowl-
edge of a condition that may produce sudden incapacity, whether that
be from an acute illness or exacerbation of symptoms from a previously
unknown or unknowable condition, could result in a variable interpreta-
tion of negligence under the law.
The task of driving varies greatly with the type of vehicle and the
individual driving that vehicle. Ralph Nader has written that the manu-
facturers of the American auto motor vehicle have concentrated upon
other factors than safety, so that all our vehicles of all types often are
almost completely unsafe.20 However, the question of negligence is not
germane to our discussion since we are concerned with the condition
of the individual driving that vehicle and the relation of his condition to
potential legal negligence. Human failure overshadows every highway
accident. Therefore the human mechanism ought to be in prime condi-
tion in order to drive the motor vehicle at any speed and under any
environmental condition. The ultimate success factor in automobile ac-
cident prevention usually is the driver. It will depend largely upon his
intelligence, his sense of personal and social responsibility, his reactions
to various stimuli in normal conditions and under any type of stress, and
his driving ability in good health or in illness.2 1
Cardiovascular, metabolic, neurologic, emotional and psychiatric
disorders, as well as alcohol and drugs, are among the leading causative
factors in careless, reckless and irresponsible driving. These disease
entities also have been the leading causes of death in the United States. 22
Cardiovascular diseases hold the first position. More than
12,830,000 Americans have heart disease, and a like number have high
blood pressure and arteriosclerosis which ultimately affects the entire
19 See, generally, Apperly, Patterns of Disease on a Basis of Physiological Pathology
(1951).
20 See, generally, Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (New York 1965).
21 Lawston, 64 Traffic Safety 12 (1964).
22 See, generally, The National Health Education Commission, Inc., Facts on the Ma-
jor Killing and Crippling Diseases in the United States (1964).
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circulatory system. 23 This group of illnesses produces a high incidence
of situations where sudden incapacity occurs. This ranges all the way
from slight dizziness and visual disturbances to death. The individual
whose disease affects the coronary arteries of the heart may have a
complete and sudden occlusion of the flow of blood through the main
artery or one of its branches. This may occur without previous warning
or without any previous knowledge of threatening health condition. It
may produce such severe pain that the individual is rendered incapable
of proper control of a motor vehicle, or the incapacity from this illness
could be due to almost immediate complete loss of consciousness or
death.
The cerebrovascular accident, often referred to by the non-medical
term "stroke," is another group in this complex of circulatory diseases.
While one usually thinks of the "stroke" as resulting in complete, sud-
den, and prolonged incapacity, or death, it should be remembered that
there are many variations in the symptomatology. Although some of
these may result in incapacity of a major nature which is easily recog-
nized, the more minor and transient may go unrecognized, but they are
capable of producing momentary and complete incapacity in a driver
of a motor vehicle. Therefore in addition to the blood clots or hemor-
rhages which affect the brain and result in the pronounced disabilities,
these transient attacks raise a major question in the problem of negli-
gence. These episodes are often referred to by the person who has suf-
fered them as "dizzy spells" or "blackouts." They usually occur from
a momentary decrease in circulating blood to the brain in persons with
vascular disease. Though the symptoms may be short in duration, the
incapacity for driving a motor vehicle may be total during this brief
time. The recovery in this situation may be complete and leave no ob-
jective evidence of it having occurred.
Aneurysms, which are pulsating dilatations of arterial walls, have
as their natural course a progressive expansion and final rupture. These
are becoming more common in the American population because of the
high incidence of atherosclerosis. They are often undetected until they
rupture. This is a catastrophic occurrence accompanied by sudden, mas-
sive internal hemorrhage, with total incapacity.
Certain metabolic disorders may also result in symptoms that will
produce sudden incapacity. Symptoms of these conditions vary from
muscle weakness, to tetany, to convulsions, to unconsciousness. Of these
illnesses, the one most commonly found to affect a driver's capacity to
handle a motor vehicle is diabetes mellitus. This is a chronic, metabolic
disease in which there is some degree of insulin insufficiency which re-
sults in an inability to metabolize carbohydrate properly. There are
23 Cecil and Leb, Textbook of Medicine 618-636, 681-710 (11th ed. Beeson & Mc-
Dermott 1963).
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approximately 2,000,000 known diabetics in the United States.2 4 In this
11% of our population who have diabetes, it is estimated that 4% go un-
recognized and therefore untreated. 25 Sudden incapacity can occur in
this illness from two separate causes. In the untreated or inadequately
treated individual, coma can result from the alteration of blood chemi-
cals that occur in improper carbohydrate metabolism. Prior to coma
onset there is usually a period of severe apathy or drowsiness, and in-
capacity for driving a motor vehicle can develop rather suddenly and
even prior to loss of consciousness. In the other situation, over treatment
by means of an excess of insulin can result in sudden development of a
shock like condition. Often the diabetic person has minimal or no warn-
ing of the impending incapacity.
In addition to the previously discussed vascular problems that affect
the brain, there are a number of neurological diseases that may result
in sudden incapacity. The only common one is epilepsy. It is one of
the oldest diseases known to mankind. It was described by Hippocrates,
and the term itself means "seizure." It is characterized by attacks of
loss of consciousness which may be accompanied by convulsions. Several
symptom types of seizures are recognized. The grand mal is one usually
associated as epilepsy by non-medical people. It is characterized by loss
of consciousness and convulsions. The petit mal type is characterized by
being more transient and manifesting a lesser mental disturbance with-
out falling or convulsions. Although this form may last for as brief a
time as thirty seconds, it can be incapacitating to the operator of a motor
vehicle. A third type known as psychic equivalents is not significant to
our discussion. Although an epileptic seizure may be preceded by an
aura, which is some form of sudden sensory change in vision or hearing,
this warning is of no help since the convulsions follow so promptly that
the individual has no time to help himself.20 There are over 800,000
persons in the United States with some form of epilepsy or approxi-
mately one out of every two hundred of our population. 27 The epileptic
is always advised to refrain from alcoholic beverages, since any type
of alcohol, or combination of alcohol and drugs could contribute to an
attack. The individual is also advised to refrain from any physical or
emotional stress. 28 Night driving is particularly dangerous to the epi-
leptic because the glare of opposing headlights can act as a stimulus to
24 Beeson and McDermott, op. cit. supra n. 23 at 1294, American Diabetic Ass'n Inc.
Facts Sheet (Aug. 1964).
25 See, generally, Joslin, Treatment of Diabetes Mellitus (10th ed. 1959); Mitchell,
Current Concepts in the Recognition and Management of Diabetes Mellitus, 0 J.
Ark. Med. Soc. 410 (1964).
26 Rupp, Management of Epilepsy, 166 A.M.A.J. 1967-1970 (1958).
27 Smith and Gips, Care of the Adult Patient, Medical-Surgical Nursing 392-399 (2d
ed. 1966).
28 Rupp, op. cit. supra n. 26, 1967-1970.
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produce an attack.2 9 In addition, the drugs used to prevent attacks all
have the side effect of producing drowsiness and, therefore, pose an addi-
tional danger to the epileptic as a driver.
Emotional and neuropsychiatric problems can be another source of
incapacity. The emotionally disturbed person can be indifferent and
despondent, or aggressive, impulsive, and antagonistic. In either case
there is impairment of judgment and a lack of alertness and attention
with slowing of the reflexes. In the neuropsychiatric individual these
processes are more pronounced. When these people are under medical
treatment they are usually taking ataractic drugs, commonly known as
tranquilizers. These drugs have side effects in the form of drowsiness
and delayed reaction time which in themselves may create a problem
for the driver.
Unfortunately, these ataractic drugs are being used today on an
extremely wide scale, rather than being limited to the groups men-
tioned above. The proportion of our driving population suffering impair-
ment of judgment, slowing of reflexes, and drowsiness is completely un-
known, but is estimated by medical authorities to constitute a significant
safety problem on the highways. Other drugs, even though taken for
specific medical therapy, have similar injurious side effects. However, the
most potent and dangerous is alcohol.
Many highway accidents are due to the drinking driver. Alcohol is
a nervous system depressant despite the fact that so many people look
upon it as a stimulant. Performance, judgment, observation, muscle co-
ordination, and tolerance of light glare are impaired by its use. It has
been found that small doses do not have a constant depressing effect
upon the output of work of an unskilled nature, but work requiring
skill and precision invariably suffers in accuracy, efficiency, and time
required for its accomplishment. Large single doses produce signs of
distinct cerebral depression which pass from muscular incoordination to
a state of unconsciousness similar to that of ether or chloroform anes-
thesia.30
This brings us to a consideration of several questions. Is the driver
of a motor vehicle who suffered sudden incapacity due to one of these
disease states negligent in the legal sense if his loss of control of the
vehicle results in personal or property damage? Is this an unavoidable
accident? Can such a driver logically plead that the occurrence is an
act of God, beyond his control, and therefore without fault?
In certain of these disease states the individual may develop sudden
incapacity without any prior knowledge of a disease existing. This is
particularly true with some of the cardiovascular illnesses such as acute
coronary occlusion, and some "strokes." The undiagnosed diabetic and
29 Smith and Gips, op. cit. supra n. 27, 392-399.
30 Cyclopedia of Medicine and Surgery Specialists 1965, 269-299 (1965).
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the initial attack of epileptic disorders may also incapacitate a driver
without any previous warning. Should a driver be so incapacitated, and
through this incapacity cause a personal or property damage incident, the
question of negligence is rather clear cut. In these situations the acci-
dent is unavoidable, for lacking prior knowledge of his physical con-
dition the prudent person would have had no opportunity to take a dif-
ferent course. The sudden occurrence of the illness lacks a human
agent and opens to such a driver the possible defense of an act of God
and lack of personal fault.3 1
The value of such a defense would be to excuse the defendant from
liability. This would be based upon the idea that he could not be respon-
sible for a happening that he could not anticipate or guard against.
3 2
Therefore, in order for an act to be considered a legal defense, it must
be proven that the sole cause of injury lacked a human agent and that
the resultant injury was an occurrence that could not have been fore-
seen or avoided by any exercise of diligence or care on the part of the
defendant. In fact nothing he could have done as a reasonable, prudent,
or diligent man would have avoided the end result.3 3 The act itself is
out of his control. In these cases the defendant must prove that the
onset of illness was sudden and without prodromata or prior warning.
Under these circumstances it can be proven that the principal cause, the
illness, lacked a human agent, both as to origin and to prevention. There-
fore, the defendant could not reasonably anticipate the occurrence and
could not reasonably be expected to guard against it. The only further
proof that must be established would be that the resulting incapacity
was of such a nature that the damage was unavoidable. If the defend-
ant is successful in showing these two factors the courts may find that
no negligence occurred. In several jurisdictions the court has so ruled.34
In many cases the sudden onset of the incapacitating illness has
been preceded by signs and symptoms. These "warnings" vary with
the individual. It is unfortunate that with many people when these
warning signs are mild and transient in character, the individual tends
to ignore them and fails to seek proper medical examination and ad-
vice. Under these circumstances the person is unaware of potential
danger to himself and of the possibility that he may become a driving
hazard. Should such an individual become a defendant the possibility of
using act of God as a defense is not as clear cut as in the previous
group of cases we have considered. Although all other factors may be
present and provable, the decision here revolves around the question
31 38 Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 4, § 65. Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, 143-46.
32 Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 35 (1953); Howie III, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 336; Findlay, op. cit.
supra n. 2 at 437.
33 38 Am. Jur., op. cit. supra n. 4 at § 65; Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 4 at 143-146.
34 Sanders v. Coleman, supra n. 14; McClean v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co.,
supra n. 14; Freifield v. Hennessy, supra n. 14.
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of whether his failure to heed prodromatal warning signs constitutes the
action of a reasonable and diligent person. This would depend upon the
degree of severity or the obvious character of the warning signs as well
as the capability of the individual to relate these as important and
potentially dangerous. Therefore, under some circumstances it would
be possible to plead act of God if the warning itself were minimal or
the ability of the defendant for reasons of intelligence or other factors
could be shown to prevent proper recognition and proper realization of
the potential danger. If such mitigation of the circumstance could be
proven, the argument that there was no deviation from the course a
reasonably prudent person would take could be substantiated. How-
ever, probably in the majority of situations this could not be proven, and
a pleading of an act of God would not be upheld by the court.
A third category of possible defendants to consider would be those
individuals who have had a diagnosed disease such as a previous myo-
cardial infarction or diabetes mellitus, and are under competent and
adequate medical care. Should a sudden incapacity such as a recurrent
myocardial infarction or insulin shock occur, the defendant could con-
ceivably plead no negligence on the basis that the incident resulted
from an act of God. It can be argued that such a person was following
the course that a reasonable, diligent, and prudent individual would
follow and, therefore, could not anticipate or further guard against the
sudden episode that occurred. Therefore, this incapacitating illness
might be considered beyond his control and without a human agent.
However, if the individual has been aware of his disease but has neg-
lected to pursue advised medical treatment no such defense would be
available.
The final category one must consider involves those individuals who
are taking medications where the side effects may impair driving
ability through the production of drowsiness, slowing of reflexes, im-
pairment of vision, or impairment of judgment. Such individuals should
be warned against driving, and when so advised they would have no
defense from negligence under a pleading of an act of God. The Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission for-
bids driving of commercial vehicles on the highway while under the
influence of any such drugs or alcohol.3 5 In addition, the American
Medical Association in its Medical Guide for Physicians has recom-
mended that individuals on these drugs be warned of the possible side
effects which might preclude driving. The statutes of the various states
are vague or non-existent in regard to this subject. Statutes requiring
a warning by physicians would be impracticable if not unenforceable.
One suggestion has been that pharmacies be required to label medications
35 National Ass'n of Motor Bus Owners, Motor Carrier Safety Regulations of the
Interstate Commerce Com. 192.1-192.5 Rev. 1952 (Sept. 5, 1962).
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at the time the prescription is filled as potentially unsafe while driving.
It has also been suggested that a simple warning symbol analogous to
the skull and crossbones of poison could be made standard for labeling
such prescriptions. The defendant driver who has been under the in-
fluence of alcohol has no defense of act of God open to him.
Conclusion
The foregoing has examined the potential value of pleading sudden
illness as act of God in auto accidents for the driver defendant. It has
been shown that such a pleading to be successful would require that the
prime cause be without human agent and that the occurrence be un-
foreseeable and unavoidable by reasonable human diligence and pru-
dence. In this evaluation the sudden incapacity, whether from an acute
illness or acute exacerbation of a chronic illness, has been grouped into
four categories. In each of these an attempt has been made to outline
the possibility of pleading this defense. These are summarized in the
following paragraphs.
In the first category are those defendants who become suddenly in-
capacitated without any prior knowledge of the existence of a disease
condition. It has been shown that a pleading of no negligence due to an
act of God may be a useful and workable defense.
The second category consists of individuals who have had prior
symptoms of their disease, but who have failed to take steps for de-
termination of the importance of these symptoms. It has been shown
that the value of such a pleading would vary within this group. If
the defendant could prove that the prodromata were so minimal or that
the defendant's intelligence or understanding was of such a nature that
his failure to obtain medical examination and advice was not unreason-
able or lacking in diligence, this defense might be useful. Without such
proof persons in this group would be unable to plead the incapacity as
an act of God because of their own failure to take proper steps for
prevention.
The third category is made up of those who have had knowledge
and adequate medical treatment for their disease but despite this have
had a sudden episode resulting in incapacity. It has been shown that
his group may profitably utilize this defense. A subgroup of people
who are aware of their disease but fail to carry out proper treatment
would have no defense in this sense.
The fourth group consists of persons who are using drugs for one
reason or another. It is obvious that they should be aware of any side
effects and the danger of driving while using the drugs. Therefore, this
defense is not available to them. It has been noted that our current
statutes are lacking in regard to this problem.
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